Page 31 - Top Cover Issue 6

TOP COVER ISSUE 6 31

much can I get onto this powerpoint? How much have I done?
How much do they remember etc etc. And the answer to all this
“how much” is usually already there in a set of bullet points and
impersonal information decided somewhere else, by someone
else.
Asking “how much” has practical advantages, but the risk of
this approach is that it sometimes feels like it was designed
for someone else, a “ Big Other” who is less interested in how
well the training has been done than how much of it has been
completed. So it’s easy for both trainer and trainee to hand over
learning to this wiser, better informed Other, with less chance
of a buy-in by the trainee. The risk is that learning remains
superficial, and there’s certainly no way of gauging if anything
has really been learnt or adopted in ways that will actually change
practices. The traditional end-of-session “knowledge check”
might provide a certain amount of information about what has
been remembered in small, independent chunks of measurable buck stops here.
information. But it’s too late at this stage to do anything if the On the other hand, though, we know that crucial decision-
test reveals any problems. So the test itself is worked out to make making situations can’t be planned 100% and that risk cannot
sure that what it tests is eminently achievable: how much is an be eliminated from the job. As trainers, we are interested
easy question to answer. But the crucial question of whether it’s in the role of risk-taking, especially in training, where a safe
useful or important takes a back seat. environment means that we can do things that help learning in
In fact, we wonder how often AFOs ask themselves these “how the knowledge that lives don’t depend immediately on them.
much” questions? This sort of question might be appropriate Beyond this, though, we are also interested in the way training
for some things in firearms, but when being debriefed in the can and should take on some aspects of risk-taking because this
judgement suite, I don’t recall being asked too many “how meets a number of crucial goals. The first of these goals is to
much…” questions. There were plenty of when questions (when work with what AFOs bring to the party. Time and time again we
did you decide…, when did you notice ……); there were plenty see AFOs arrive on a NFIC programme on day one, exhibiting all
of where questions too (where was ….., where did you …….) the signs of defensiveness one would expect from someone in a
and of course the why (why did you decide to…., why didn’t new situation. They know the whole programme will challenge
you….). them, but AFOs are looking forward to that: after all, they are
Our question is about whether a complex role is really about used to the technical stuff – they wouldn’t be on NFIC otherwise.
asking “how much”, or whether it’s really about those much more What they are less confident about is the thought of the
interesting questions of when, where, who, why and even what “academic input”, all this high-falutin stuff that those University
if…. These are not questions that can be answered upstream, people are going to bore them with…the body language alone
and they depend instead on complex decisions that have to be tends to send the same message: this academic stuff is not my
made on the basis of qualitative assessment of the situation and world, and I’m no longer so sure of myself, so I’m not going to
the context. take any risks and make myself look a fool.
So we question the usefulness of “front-loading” in some firearms This is a problem for us as trainers, because we need a real
training, because front loading doesn’t recognise the way dialogue with our trainees. First off, we need to know what they
many situations are about interpretations, decisions, reactions. are really capable of, not what image they want us to see. Second,
Even apparently fact-based input, like our dangerous animals we need real-time feedback on what’s going on, what’s being
session, often works best when based around problem solving, understood, what we need to do to make it work better. And
or discussion around a scenario, or discovering a way of dealing third we need trainees to feel that the training is about them, not
with things. This is because AFOs are never, in our experience, us: we need engagement with what’s going on so that what’s
empty mugs to be filled, but resourceful, thinking people with a going on isn’t just “input” or even “intake” but involvement. But
wealth of experience to draw on. This experience may or may not to be really involved, a risk has to be taken: we all have to take
be similar to what we are trying to teach, but people as a rule are the chance that this will work rather than assuming it won’t. So
actually quite good at transferring knowledge from one domain we think that AFO training can’t be content with asking itself
to another, if you give them the chance, that is. Experience in “how much”. It needs to take the risk of asking those other, more
one branch of work can be put to use in another, and we see difficult questions…and trusting each other to deal intelligently
time and time again how a hobby, an interest or a seemingly with whatever responses they elicit. Let’s face it: without that
trivial incident actually informs the AFO role in concrete and trust, what hope is there of having any real impact?
valuable ways.
That’s why one of the things that strikes us every time we do a For further information regarding Chris and Sabrina’s research
NFIC is the way in which AFOs pick up on the need to develop on the professionalisation of Firearms Instructors please contact
and experiment so quickly. This is always a surprise because us at Sabrina.poma@canterbury.ac.uk
AFOs are bound to a culture where risk-taking is a double
edged-sword.
On one hand, they are out on the streets. But at the back of every
officer’s mind is that the gun always smokes backwards: every WRITTEN BY CHRIS BEIGHTON AND SABRINA POMA
move an AFO makes has to be traceable, and the individual is SENIOR LECTURERS, CANTERBURY CHRIST CHURCH UNIVERSITY
potentially accountable for every split second decision. Policing
is genetically risk averse, which is how it should be when the